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On Pure Reflection
A Reply to Dan Zahavi
In his reply to our article ‘The validity of first-person descriptions as
authenticity and coherence’ (Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009), published
in the special issue of JCS 10 years of Viewing from Within: the Leg-
acy of Francisco Varela, Dan Zahavi (2011, hereafter DZ) formulates
interesting objections to our line of arguments on three crucial points:
the definition of ‘reflection’and ‘reflective consciousness’, the role of
language in reports of first-person experience, and the canonical dif-
ference between phenomenology and introspection. We will address
these issues in turn, yet concentrating on the first two points since the
last objection is more specifically aimed at Pierre Vermersch’s contri-
bution ‘Describing the practice of introspection’.
An important premise concerns the negative use of the term ‘reflec-
tion’ (non-reflective, pre-reflective). We fully agree with DZ about his
delineation of prereflective experience: prereflective experience is
unnoticed, but not unconscious. When we wrote that ‘we are unaware
of our (lived) experience’, we only meant the following: in the process
of experiencing, our attention is so narrowly focused, so quick in
changing its focus from one relevant object to another, that it simply
leaves aside a large amount of the overall experienced content (which
is nevertheless retained in a form of ‘passive memory’, as opposed to
the active memory of attended episodes). This unattended rather than
unconscious status accounts for the relatively easy retrospective
accessibility of the prereflective material of experience during the
explicitation interviews (Vermersch, 1999), and it explains the feeling
expressed by many interviewees of merely realizing the richness of
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what they had lived through. However, this remark about the adjective
‘prereflective’ has important consequences for our understanding of
what reflection is. Reflection does not amount to perceiving con-
sciously some unconscious event taken as an object (unlike Freud in
his Papers on Metapsychology), but rather renewing contact with
experience and defocusing/refocusing our attention. In other terms,
DZ’s cogent remarks about the meaning of ‘prereflective’ reinforces
rather than challenges our immanent understanding of reflection.
Conversely, his remarks tend to weaken rather than strenghen a tran-
scendent understanding of reflection, in which the reflecting and the
reflected are thought of as facing each other, thus rehearsing the
subject-object divide within the field of experience.
But this is only a hint of what follows. To proceed, we must investi-
gate further the issue of reflection by addressing three important con-
cerns expressed by DZ: (i) are there other types of reflection beyond
the one that fits our immanent characterization (close contact with
experience and defocused unfolding of it), (ii) does this latter type of
reflection in which there is no ‘self-fission’ between a reflecting and a
reflected subject really exist, and (iii) if this kind of immanent reflec-
tion indeed exists, does it afford us knowledge (and, by the way does it
deserve the name ‘reflection’)?
To start with, DZ is perfectly right when he notices that there is a
mental operation by which we distantiate ourselves from our own
judgments and actions, in such a way that we become able to critical
assessment; and that this clearly departs from mere immanent immer-
sion in experience and expanding the attentional field. Self-distantia-
tion is indeed a condition for self-consciousness and self-criticism,
which is the basis of moral life. But what exactly is the nature of this
operation of self-distantiation? The fact that the adjective ‘self-con-
scious’ is used in this context instead of ‘self-aware’ is not innocent,
and might be the best clue we have to disclose it. In standard English,
‘self-consciousness’ implies an excess of objective self-examination,
a complete lack of coincidence of oneself with oneself, so much so
that this imposes clumsiness on action and loss of confidence. Full
distantiation from oneself yields not so much self-revelation as alien-
ation in the most straightforward generally accepted sense: becoming
an alien for oneself, judging oneself as if one were somebody else (or
adopting the position and conceptions of somebody else). And this
kind of alienation, in turn, is deeply connected to the social basis of
morals: in order to judge myself I must have internalized the com-
monly accepted criteria and values that apply to anybody’s deeds.
Borrowing an expression from Paul Ricoeur (1990), distantiating
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self-examination presupposes treating ‘oneself as another’. In the
preface of the book that bears this title, Ricoeur then insists on distin-
guishing two varieties of reflection, corresponding to the two classes
of reflexive pronouns: the reflexive pronouns with objective or sub-
jective grammatical function respectively. ‘Myself’ is a reflexive pro-
noun with objective function (used in the third person), whereas ‘I’ is
a reflexive pronoun with subjective function (used in the first person).
This becomes obvious in the proposition: ‘I am criticizing myself’.
With this distinction in mind, reflection can concern either (a) experi-
ence as it is lived in the first person, or (b) acts, thoughts and inten-
tions as they are evaluated in the third person (irrespective of whether
they concern oneself or another). To sum up, one species of reflection
concerns the experience that I live, and the other species concerns
my/his mental habits or behaviour. The self-distantiating type of
reflection referred to by DZ is likely to belong to the second category,
and looks therefore irrelevant to the project of exploration of one’s
own experience that we sketch in our article.
In his distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ reflection (which is
evoked by DZ, and which we will discuss later on), Sartre develops
this kind of distinction at length. Pure reflection is such that ‘the
reflecting is the reflected in full immanence’; in it, the reflecting
cannot be said to adopt a point of view on some distantiated object
(Sartre, 1943, p. 194). Instead, impure reflection tends to the ‘unveil-
ing of the object that I am’; impure reflection is a (vain) effort ‘to be
another yet remaining oneself’ (Sartre, 1943, p. 201). Here again, a
distinction is made between first-person and third-person-like reflec-
tion, between reflective awareness of what I am living, and self-evalu-
ation of myself. The problem is that in this case, the connection
between the two types of reflection becomes quite elusive. We have
captured both of them with a unique word (‘reflection’), but this lexi-
cal convention might well express a mere Wittgensteinean ‘family
resemblance’ rather than a true concept. ‘Impure’ (third-person)
reflection fully deserves the mirror-like connotations of the verb ‘to
reflect’, because it consists in seeing oneself with the help of a certain
instrument or procedure as if one were adopting an external stand-
point. On the contrary, the nature of ‘pure’ reflection remains incom-
pletely decided at this stage of the discussion. There might still be
room for a remnant of duality of reflecting and reflected in it; yet, as
we will see, such duality raises serious doubts. In view of these
doubts, is it reasonable to call it ‘reflection’ (as DZ rightly wonders),
thus automatically triggering spurious images of light travelling from
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oneself as an object to a mirror and back to the (mind’s) eye?
Shouldn’t we invent a new word?
It might be too hasty and too destabilizing to change our vocabulary
at this point. Let us then stick, for the time being, to the tradition by
using expressions such as Sartre’s ‘pure reflection’ (or ‘phenomeno-
logical reflection’ as suggested by DZ); and let us see what has come
out of the vast inquiry launched by Husserl’s lineage on this central
theme. Even more than the explicit conclusions drawn by these
authors, what will prove instructive are the internal tensions of their
thoughts, and the difficult compromises that yield such conclusions.
Starting with Husserl, we find, in full agreement with DZ, that his
clearest characterization of phenomenological reflection (a type of
reflection in which the reflecting self suspends its ‘natural beliefs’)
involves self-fission between a reflected self and a reflecting self; and
that in this self-fission I become ‘spectator of myself’ (Husserl, 1959,
pp. 92, 96). But Husserl’s position on this issue of inner dualism is
much more nuanced than what this paragraph and similar ones in
other texts (Husserl, 2002, pp. 10–11) seem to indicate when taken in
isolation. A few pages after he has made such a sharp statement about
the duality of reflecting and reflected selves, Husserl adds an impor-
tant qualification. It is not true, he writes, that, while reflecting on an
act of perception, I become blind to the perceived object. In fact, dur-
ing reflection ‘I remain clearsighted for everything’ (Husserl, 1959,
p. 111). While reflecting, my field of attention has broadened to the
point where I can encompass both the object and the intentional
directedness towards it, the first order and the higher-order conscious
act. During the so-called self-fission, Husserl goes on, I am ‘at the
same time’ (not alternately) a perceiving subject and a self-knowing
subject. Self-fission thus does not mean real separation, but increase
of ‘clearsightedness’, ability of circulating across various aspects of
experience, enhanced sensitivity to the ‘sides’ or margins of experi-
ence (Husserl, 2002, p. 11). Self-fission is a process rather than a
state; it is a functional dualization within a unique flux of experience
rather than a duality. The spurious connotations of the metaphor of fis-
sion must then be defused after it has served its purpose. This is done
by Husserl in other texts, especially in Ideen I. There, Husserl first
declares that any cogitatio can become the object of an ‘inner percep-
tion’ and thereby of a reflective evaluation (Husserl, 1952, p. 67). But
later on he undertakes a careful distinction between the usual version
of reflection that concerns ‘a fragment of nature’ (taken as an object),
and phenomenological reflection that opens up the entire field of
‘pure consciousness’ (Husserl, 1952, p. 95). In the latter case, the
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dualist metaphor is soon attenuated, and what replaces it sounds
remarkably different. In a central section of his master work, Husserl
thus explains that reflection is a ‘modification of consciousness’, a
‘transmutation of lived experience as a whole’ rather than a mere layer
in a stratified series of partial experiences (Husserl, 1952, p. 148). We
therefore agree with Natalie Depraz (2008, p. 103) that these internal
tensions in Husserl’s characterization of phenomenological reflection
are preparing ‘a radical questioning of the model of reflectivity in
favor of the receptive observing openness of the subject to the given’.
This radical move is illustrated e.g. by Merleau-Ponty (1960, p. 22),
who notices that the proper attitude of a philosopher who practices his
discipline in the spirit of phenomenology (or Bergsonian intuition)
‘… is not a head-on relation between the spectator and the show; it is
rather like complicity, like an oblique and clandestine relation’.
We may now wonder about the reason for this persistant use of the
image of split, fission, or inner duality of reflection, despite so much
discomfort and so many deviations of the phenomenological dis-
course with respect to it. Analysing some tensions of Sartre’s concepts
of reflection may help us to sort out the situation. To begin with,
reflection arises from a very basic proto-reflective feature of con-
sciousness. The crucial feature is that ‘any positional consciousness
of an object is simultaneously non-positional consciousness of itself’
(Sartre, 1943, p. 19). Proto-reflectivity is not yet reflection stricto
sensu, since ‘non-positionality’ means that the primary consciousness
of an object is not in turn taken as a higher-order object. But it makes
reflection possible, by exhibiting a domain of experience that could be
objectified later. With such preliminary remarks in mind, it is tempt-
ing to anticipate that, by contrast with proto-reflection, any type of
reflection should by definition involve subject-object duality. But
Sartre’s text does not exactly fulfill this expectation. When he devel-
ops his concept of ‘pure reflection’, we find him struggling between
two antinomic characterizations.
On the one hand ‘pure reflection’ is overtly said not to be tanta-
mount to Spinoza’s idea ideae, idea of an idea, new act of conscious-
ness pointed towards the original act of consciousness.1 For, if it were
the case, one would lose the very motivation of the phenomenological
method, which aims at coinciding so tightly and ‘intuitively’ with its
domain of investigation that certainty can be reached. About a truly
external object apprehended by way of its aspects or ‘adumbrations’,
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[1] ‘If a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it’ (Spinoza, 1985, II,
p. 21, note).
doubt is always a possibility; but about that for which there are objects
in the first place, and about that with which the reflecting conscious-
ness coincides, there can be certainty. One must then accept ‘…that
reflection is united to the reflected by a link of Being; that reflecting
consciousness is reflected consciousness’ (Sartre, 1943, p. 191). This
statement of virtual identity is repeated many times by Sartre. The
reflecting, he insists, is not truly different from the reflected; for the
reflected is nothing else than what the reflecting has to be. Accord-
ingly, the apprehension of the reflected by the reflecting is not pro-
gressive but rather immediate; it is a ‘fulgurant and flat intuition’ in
which ‘everything is given simultaneously in a sort of absolute prox-
imity’ (Sartre, 1943, p. 195). This description clearly resonates with
the metaphor of decrease of distance, close contact, recovery of our
own integrity, that we used when recovered awareness of
pre-reflective experience was at stake.
On the other hand, Sartre thinks he has a good reason to correct his
initial statement of immediacy and coincidence. Whereas the claim of
apodicticity requires ontological identity of the reflecting and the
reflected, the claim of knowledge requires that ‘the reflected be an
object for the reflection, which implies a separation of being’. To be
certain is to coincide, but to know is to apprehend something differ-
ent: an object. The paradoxical consequence of this twofold condition
is that ‘the reflecting must be and not be the reflected’ (Sartre, 1943,
p. 191). But how is this possible? In order to dispel this (apparent or
real) contradiction, Sartre summons up the resources of his own ontol-
ogy, especially the distinction between ‘in-itself’ and ‘for-itself’.
Whereas the in-itsef (a thing) is self-identical, substantial and passive,
the for-itself (a conscious being) is divided from itself, or rather from
what it purports to be, by a sort of gap of constantly renewed
unaccomplisment. The characteristic of a being which is present to
itself is to be ‘not exactly itself’. For consciousness, to be is ‘to exist at
a distance of itself as presence to itself; and this null distance that
being incorporates in its own being is nothingness’ (Sartre, 1943,
p. 116). The apparent or real contradiction that singularizes the for-
itself (distance with respect to itself but null distance), is quite similar
to what we described about pure reflection. In fact, according to
Sartre, this similarity is by no means surprising because (pure) reflec-
tion is inherent to the mode of being of the for-itself (Sartre, 1943,
p. 194). It has only to be realized that reflection is a special instance of
the spontaneous operation of the for-itself: an intermediary between
‘… the mere existence of the pure for-itself and existence for another’
(ibid.). In other terms, we could say that Sartre’s pure reflection is an
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intermediary between pre-reflective consciousness and ‘impure’
reflection, or reflection of oneself as another.
In this discussion, we have reached a maximum of tension in lexi-
con and representations. The standard dualist image of knowledge is
simultaneously asserted and denied. The reflecting is and is not the
reflected, there is distance between them but this distance is null, there
is no object of pure reflection but only a ‘quasi-object’, pure reflection
needs separation but ‘fission is only realized in existence for another’
(Sartre, 1943, p. 194) etc. Is the epistemological motivation of this
tension incontrovertible? We have seen that Sartre assumes that ‘… if
(reflection) is to be knowledge, the reflected must be object for the
reflecting’, for ‘to know is to become other’ (Sartre, 1943, pp. 191,
195). It is for this precise reason that he does not content himself with
statements of identity, immediacy, or proximity. Even in this arche-
typal case of intermingling between the subject and object of inquiry,
some sort of separation must be imposed in order to get knowledge.
But a twofold doubt arises at this point.
Firstly, does Sartre really need to impose his traditional epistemo-
logical norm on pure reflection? After all, Sartre accepts that the ele-
mentary experience of reflection is not cognition but recognition; he
also declares (as noticed by DZ) that we learn nothing from pure
reflection (Sartre, 1943, p. 195). There might be no knowledge gained
by the mere act of pure reflection, after all.
Secondly, is this common epistemological statement rehearsed by
Sartre incontrovertibly valid? Is it true that there is no possible knowl-
edge without an immediate split between subject and object in the
very act of production of a phenomenon? This latter question seems to
be answered in the positive by DZ, when he suggests in his reply that a
scientific exploration of consciousness must rely on a self-distancing
form of reflection; and even more explicitly when he asks ‘If no
knowledge whatsoever is acquired (by pure reflection), what would be
the cognitive value of the process?’. But we rather incline to think, on
the basis of an alternative epistemological position, that knowledge
can indeed be acquired this way, and this may explain our
disagreement with DZ.
In fact, the debate between knowledge as intimacy and knowledge
as separation is age-old. A long tradition, that can be traced (at least)
back to the Renaissance, considers that knowledge requires close par-
ticipation of the knower to the nature of the known. Goethe carried on
this tradition in the wake of the romantic philosophy of nature, by
developing a theory of lived and experienced color, as opposed to
Newton’s theory of objectified light (Zajonc, 1995). Later on, Henri
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Bergson developed his entire philosophy as a reaction of ‘intuitive’
knowledge against the monopole of the analytical thought typical of
physics. And Paul Claudel (1984) provided this idea with a poetical
expression by displaying a phonetic kinship between the French word
for ‘knowing’ (‘connaître’) and the French expression for ‘being born
together with’ (‘co-naître’). Against this entrenched belief, many
reactions were formulated in the name of the scientific method, or in
the name of a quest of alterity (as opposed to all-pervasive identity).
Reacting to Bergson’s dream of immediacy, Moritz Schlick (1932/
2003) thus insisted that knowledge of something requires comparison
with something else and therefore detachment from that thing. Having
a thing, or being that thing, is a premise (or a foundation) of knowl-
edge, but is by no means knowledge itself. Emmanuel Levinas con-
cluded a similar criticism with a sharp sentence that was supposed to
close the debate: ‘Without separation, there would not have been
Truth but only Being’ (Levinas, 2003, p. 54).
However, a closer examination of this issue shows that the standard
divide between participatory and detached knowledge is too sharp to
be faithful to several crucial areas of science. One of these crucial
areas is quantum mechanics, which may have very important lessons
in store for ‘pure reflection’ of experience, and which narrowly com-
bines the participative and objectifying steps of knowledge.
Merleau-Ponty (1964, p. 38) himself recognized the epistemological
interest of quantum mechanics when he mentioned that, in this branch
of modern physics, the original assumption of a detached spectator is
undermined by the development of science itself; and that this
reminds us the broader lesson according to which the subjec-
tive/objective divide, far from being a fact of the world, is precari-
ously extracted from ‘total experience’. A central feature of standard
quantum mechanics, against which virtually all the attempts at finding
a ‘realist’ interpretation have stumbled, is contextuality. For a phe-
nomenon, to be contextual means that it is impossible to separate, in it,
the contribution of the apparatus (a material extension of the knower)
from the contribution of whatever is probed by it (the known). Does
this highly participatory characteristic imply that knowledge is impos-
sible in microphysics, or that quantum mechanics is not objective? By
no means! Heisenberg (1942/1998, p. 268) gave a very clear state-
ment of how one can elaborate objective knowledge out of highly
intricate phenomena from which our participation cannot be disentan-
gled: ‘… the fact that [phenomena are not objectified] can be
objectified in turn and studied in its connection with other facts’. In
other terms, what is objectified in quantum mechanics is not the
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phenomenon itself, but the anticipative structure that enables one to
connect a prior (experimental) phenomenon to possible future (exper-
imental) phenomena (Bitbol, 1996, p. 227). What can be obtained out
of the spatio-temporally located phenomena observed in laboratories
is not direct objectification of a spatio-temporal continuant, but
instead indirect objectification of a predictive symbol represented in a
Hilbert space. This has afforded a tool of technological mastery whose
universal efficacy is unprecedented, although the type of anticipation
it allows is only probabilistic and contextual. Similarly, we argue that
even though ‘pure reflection’ of, or contact with, one’s lived experi-
ence does not constitute by itself anything like objective knowledge, it
is possible to extract intersubjectively valid structures out of the
reports that arise from this reflection or contact. Here, as in quantum
mechanics, knowledge does not occur at the first level of phenomenal
acquaintance with its so-called ‘object’, but at the second level of
elaboration of a network of relations between the various expressions
of this acquaintance. It is not immediate self-knowledge of the sub-
ject, but mediated knowledge for a community of researchers. The
method of interviews of explicitation we use is precisely aimed at pro-
moting this two-step process: firstly favouring exquisite intimacy of
the subjects with their own experience, stripping themselves of the
prejudices and mental structures that hinder their close contact with or
dwelling in their experience; and secondly extracting structural
information from the reports generated this way.
It is now time to come back to the problem of vocabulary raised by
DZ: one wonders ‘… whether this phenomenon (of pure reflection)
really qualifies as a form of reflection’. Is Sartre’s ‘pure reflection’ a
case of reflection at all? As we suggested earlier, the word ‘reflection’
indeed looks far-fetched when such a process of immersion in experi-
ence, broadening of the field of attention, and expression of it, is con-
cerned. But it seems to us that the word ‘reflection’ is similarly
unsuited to the alternative process of detached self-examination of
habit and behavior combined with a narrative of ego-construction. For
this latter process does not afford true (‘reflected’) knowledge of our
own experience, but only rational reconstruction of our persona by
way of socially accepted psychological categories. In both cases, the
word ‘reflection’ appears as nothing more than a metaphor aimed at
sketching a (suitable or unsuitable) ideal of self-knowledge rather
than the real procedure carried out to obtain it. This is why, whenever
possible, we prefer to use the expression ‘becoming aware’ (Depraz et
al., 2003) because it has the advantage of emphasizing the dynamics
of an experiential process.
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This brings us closer to the issue of the relation between language
and first-person experience. Drawing from Bergson, DZ expresses a
nuanced concern about the ability of language to ‘convey or render the
subtleties of our experiential life’. To answer this concern, we deliber-
ately choose not to adduce any more theoretical considerations but
rather to present a concrete report of first-person experience, and to
comment on it.
I am in a café, absorbed in a lively philosophical discussion with my
friend Paul. At the beginning of the conversation, my attention is com-
pletely focused on the content of the ideas. But as the discussion goes
on, my mode of attention progressively changes and I start to become
aware of other dimensions of my experience. I first realize that we also
speak with our hands, and that I was initially unaware of our gestures.
I then realize that I am feeling many emotions triggered by the ideas
we are exchanging, that these emotions are experienced in several
parts of my body (especially my chest and my throat), and that I was
not clearly aware of this. Suddenly, I also become aware of a vague
and diffuse, yet intense and specific feeling which is likely to have
been within me from the very instant I was in Paul’s presence: the
energy, the rhythm, the special ‘atmosphere’ that emanates from him,
his highly personal way of being present. At the moment I become
aware of this feeling, I keep on participating in the conversation, but
the field of my attention is now broader and defocused. I do not try to
capture this feeling but it imposes itself on me. It is as if instead of try-
ing to fetch it, I am allowing it to come to me, to pervade me. While I
adopt this open and receptive form of attention, I am present and
awake but lightly so, effortlessly and without tension.
We would now like to appeal to you, reader, and ask you: what was
your experience while you were reading these lines? What happened
to you? When you read these words, you may have recognized
immediately a form of experience you lived in the past. Or may be
these words evoked nothing in you. In either case (and in intermediate
cases as well), the recognition or the absence of recognition occurred
by due reference to your own experience. But in order to go beyond
this, beyond a mere feeling of familiarity or unfamiliarity with the
experience that has just been described, you should take a step further:
bracket your preconceptions about intersubjectivity or about reflec-
tion, avoid referring to a class of experiences, and rather pay attention
to a singular experience located in space and time. For one does not
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live an experience ‘in general’.2 The more you call up a singular expe-
rience, the closer you come to the pre-reflective dimension of your
experience and the more you will be able to appreciate our description
and either specify or challenge it.
What happened exactly? I did not describe the content of my expe-
rience with all its details, since I said nothing, for instance, about what
is precisely Paul’s special quality of presence. However, my special
way of apprehending my own experience and wording it encouraged
you to relate yourself to your own experience. This twofold process
— that goes from my experience to words and from words to your
experience — is very specific. It would have been different if I had
written a poem about my experience in this café. In our example, the
functional relation between experience and words can be called a rela-
tion of description, whereas in the case of a poem, it would be a rela-
tion of expression. The effect of words on an interlocutor is different:
whereas an expression gives rise to some experience in her (say a feel-
ing, an emotion), describing a given experience gives rise to an active
process of recognition of this experience. The linguistic tools used in
both cases are also different. Expression uses an indirect, metaphori-
cal (Findlay, 1948) and oblique3 language that aims at giving rise to a
certain experiential content, a ‘world’ of experience. Instead, descrip-
tion uses a direct language that aims at showing and pointing towards
some given dimension of experience. The function of a description is
not to portray a content of experience with all its nuances — words are
indeed incapable of that — but to work out an intersubjective consen-
sus about a term or a group of terms that will only play the role of
‘pointers’. This occurs as soon as several subjects agree on using such
terms to single out a special aspect of the flux of experience; and the
agreement is obtained by establishing a stable feedback loop between
the experience whose aknowledgment is caused by the chosen terms
in one subject, and their circumstance of use by other subjects. The
said terms, used during an explicitation interview or in other circum-
stances, may be first as vague as a ‘direct reference’ in Gendlin’s sense
(such as ‘that thing’, ‘this’) (Gendlin, 1962/1997). By themselves,
such signs have a very broad and unspecific meaning (an ‘indicative’
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[2] Even Husserl’s ‘intuition of essences’ is no exception to this statement. Indeed, having the
intuition of an essence is itself a singular experience.
[3] The concept of indirect or oblique communication has been developed by several Western
philosophers, such as Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, and even the late
Wittgenstein. But in China the use of this type of language is much older and widespread,
and it has also been theorized. François Jullien (1997) has clearly analysed the subtle
methods that ancient Chinese poets used to give rise to a certain experience by writing
‘next to’.
meaning in Husserl’s sense). But if used in a precise context of dia-
logue about what is lived, they have the power to flag here and now an
aspect of some singular, concrete and rich experience (such as Paul’s
quality of presence). Whereas an expression gives rise to a world in
us, a description points towards a world, just as with the well-known
‘finger pointing at the moon’.
In other terms, what is sought is not depiction or one-one corre-
spondence between an item of language and an item of experience, but
rather producing a perlocutionary effect. The aim of a description is to
trigger recognition of an aspect of experience in other subjects, and to
reach agreement with them on using simple and ‘cheap’ (Clark, 2008)
terms that have little or no expressive power yet ‘label’ this special
and complex moment of experience. For instance, oenologists have
agreed to call ‘outline’ the — diffuse or well-defined — feeling of
‘form’ aroused by the wine when it is still in the mouth (Courtier,
2007, p. 134). The Japanese agree to call ‘mono no aware’ a certain
realization of the transient nature of things, an emotional sense of the
impermanence of life, that haikus are aimed at triggering (Colombetti,
2009, p. 19). Similarly, we may agree on a special label for flagging
the ‘quality of presence’ of somebody. But unlike those of a poem,
such a word does not adduce by itself the taste of the experience. It
only acquires its meaning by the act of recognition it elicits.
What do the words and sentences of phenomenology do to us? How
are they different from those of poetry? Since they help us to recog-
nize a dimension of our experience (if not, what would be their
worth?), what is exactly this process of recognition, and what are the
criteria by which we assess a description meant to arouse it? It seems
to us that these questions open a hitherto little explored direction of
research.
Reading the description of an experience gives rise to our recogni-
tion of this experience, provided we fuel this process (which is thus
more active than what is triggered by reading a poem) by referring to
some of our own singular experiences. Sometimes we immediately
recognize an aspect of our experience of which we were reflectively
conscious. Sometimes we must call up more precisely one or more
experiences before we recognize it. Sometimes again, we do not rec-
ognize anything, for many possible reasons. But in every case, refer-
ring to singular situated experiences, to ‘what a given individual
might currently be experiencing’ (DZ), is the proper ground of any
intersubjective agreement on the structure of experience. Far from
hindering access to experiential invariants, direct reference to a singu-
lar experience is our only reliable route towards them. The example
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we developed was aimed at showing this: the concrete and situated
description of ‘a discussion with Paul’ allowed us to recognize a struc-
tural dimension of the experience of encounter that we provisionally
called ‘the feeling of presence’. This example also enabled us to rec-
ognize ‘an essential structure and condition of possibility’ (DZ) of the
process of becoming aware: the defocused, receptive, and non-inten-
tional character of the attentional state that allows it. Referring to a
single lived experience allowed us to start to create with you, reader,
some agreement on these invariants. The agreement bear on the acts
that allow us to recognize these invariants and on the words that allow
us to point towards them, rather than on a content of experience.
After all, the reader of a phenomenological description that alleg-
edly exposes an essence (or invariant) of experience cannot accept it
on the basis of the authority of anybody, not even the authority of
Husserl or Heidegger. The reader of a phenomenological description
cannot save herself the necessity of reenacting the process that led to
such description; she must do it again. A phenomenologist should not
only invite the reader to implicit recognition or adhesion, but should
rather allow the reader to probe into her own experience and assess the
proposed description. This presupposes a higher-level description of
the very process of becoming aware and describing. It is precisely this
anchoring in singular experience that seems to us the true difference
between an abstract hermeneutical work and an active, lively, and
embodied phenomenological discourse.
References
Bitbol, M. (1996) Schrödinger’s Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics. Dordrecht:
Kluwer.
Clark, A. (2008) Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Exten-
sion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Colombetti, G. (2009). What language does to feelings, Journal of Consciousness
Studies 16 (10–12), pp. 4-26.
Courtier, M. (2007) Le dictionnaire de la langue du vin. Paris: CNRS éditions.
Claudel, P. (1984). Art Poétique. Paris: Gallimard.
Depraz, N., Varela, F. & Vermersch, P. (2003) On Becoming Aware. Amsterdam:
John Benjamins.
Depraz, N. (2008) Lire Husserl en phénoménologue. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France.
Findlay, J.N. (1948) Recommendations regarding the language of introspection,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 9, pp. 212–236.
Gendlin E. (1962/1997) Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press.
Heisenberg, W. (1942/1998) Philosophie, le manuscrit de 1942. Paris: Editions du
Seuil.
36 M. BITBOL AND C. PETITMENGIN
Husserl, E. (1952) Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomen-
ologischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die
Fundamente der Wissenschaften, Husserliana V. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1959) Erste Philosophie (1923/24), Zweiter Teil, Theorie der
phänomenologischen Reduktion, Husserliana VIII. Den Haag: Martinus
Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (2002) Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion, Husserliana XXXIV.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Jullien, F. (1997) Le détour et l’accès. Paris: Livre de Poche.
Lévinas, E. (2003) Totalité et infini. Paris: Le livre de Poche.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1960) Éloge de la Philosophie. Paris: Gallimard.
Petitmengin, C. and Bitbol, M. (2009) The validity of first-person descriptions as
authenticity and coherence’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16 (10–12),
pp. 363–404
Ricoeur, P. (1990) Soi-même comme un autre. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Sartre, J.-P. (1943) L’être et le néant. Paris: Gallimard.
Schlick, M. (1932/2003) Forme et contenu. Paris: Agone.
Spinoza, B. (1985) Ethics, in: E. Curley (ed.), The Collected Writings of Spinoza
Princeton: Princeton University Press, volume 1.
Vermersch, P. (1999) Introspection as practice, Journal of Consciousness Studies,
6 (2–3), pp. 15–42.
Zahavi, D. (2011) Varieties of reflection, Journal of Consciousness Studies (this
issue).
Zajonc, A. (1995) Catching the Light. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A REPLY TO DAN ZAHAVI 37
